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Fundamental Valuation of  
Extra-Financial Information 
 
 
Abstract: In this study, we augment seminal models based on Ohlson (1995) by 
integrating the value impact of ratings related to three different extra-financial categories, 
i. e. corporate governance, human capital, and innovation capital. For a sample of large 
European public firms, we find that a model including human capital information and 
analysts’ earnings forecasts best explains current stock prices. Our model based on 
human capital information (without analysts’ forecasts) best identifies under- and 
overvalued companies and is thus useful for generating future positive hedge returns. 
This supports the findings of Dechow et al. (1999), who hold that models incorporating 
analysts’ forecasts are superior in explaining contemporaneous market prices and 
models lacking this information exhibit the greatest predictive ability. We find that  
extra-financial information indeed conveys value relevant information beyond accounting 
figures and analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
 
Keywords:  Capital markets; Extra-financial information; Information dynamics; 
Ohlson (1995) model; Valuation models 
 
JEL-Classification: J24, M41 
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Fundamental Valuation of Extra-Financial Information 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this study, we analyze whether extra-financial information (EFI) is useful for explaining 
firms’ current market prices and for identifying under- and overvalued firms. We use the 
term EFI because it lends a broader connotation than intangible assets or intellectual 
capital. We specifically study the effects of corporate governance (CG), human capital 
(HC), and innovation capital (IC) information. The remainder of the introduction is 
structured as follows: First, we present empirical evidence for the relationship between 
EFI and company performance, respectively the stock price. Then, we map the 
theoretical link between EFI and the residual income used to determine the fundamental 
value of a company. Finally, we give an overview of the implemented valuation models 
based on Ohlson (1995) and pose our research questions. 
 
The notion whether EFI contributes in determining the fundamental value of firms is 
supported by growing literature dealing with corporate market value and book value. 
Many studies attribute extra-financials to the discrepancy between a firm’s book value 
and market value. Among these studies is Sáenz (2005), who examines the relationship 
between human, structural and relational capital indicators and the market-to-book ratio 
for banks in Spain. He finds a positive relationship between HC indicators and the 
market-to-book ratio. Amir and Lev (1996) investigate the value relevance of financial 
and non-financial information in the cellular communications industry and Deng et al. 
(1999) look at the ability of patent-related measures to predict stock returns and market-
to-book ratios. 
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Daniel and Titman (2006), a recent study that examines the book-to-market effect on 
stock returns, takes an innovative approach that distinguishes between information on 
tangible and intangible assets. Tangible assets are defined as measures of past 
accounting-based performance and intangible assets as the component of news about 
future performance, which is unrelated to past performance. Daniel and Titman (2006) 
show that future stock market performance can be explained by past intangible asset 
information, but not by past tangible asset information. They argue that there is a 
negative relationship between past intangible assets information and future performance 
which can be best explained by investors who overreact to intangible assets information. 
With respect to stock returns, Edmans (2007) finds that Fortune magazine’s “Best 
companies to work for in America” earned 14% per year over 1998-2005, which is 
double the market return. They outperformed market, industry and characteristics 
benchmarks at long-horizons. Aggarwal et al. (2007) compare the CG of foreign firms 
with the governance of similar U.S. firms. They find that firms with independent board 
and audit committees are valued higher. In contrast, they observe that the separation of 
the chairman of the board and of the CEO functions, for example, is not associated with 
higher shareholder wealth. Using Tobin’s q and the return on assets as measures of 
performance, Jermias (2007) finds that managerial share ownership has a positive effect 
on the relationship between companies’ R & D intensity and performance. However, the 
aforementioned CEO duality has a negative effect on the relationship. Völckner and 
Pirchegger (2006) confirm the importance of intangible assets. They find from a survey 
of German companies that managers regard intangible assets as important value 
drivers. However, they document that current practices in measurement, management, 
and reporting of intangible assets are not in line with the requirements postulated in the 
literature.  
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The idea for including EFI in the residual income dynamics of an Ohlson (1995) type- 
model is linked to the following arguments. First, EFI can be a source of competitive 
advantage or disadvantage. This is e. g. underpinned by strategic management theory. 
Building on Barney (1991) and Grant (1991), a firm can establish a sustainable 
competitive advantage when it manages to establish rare, inimitable, valuable, and non-
substitutable capabilities based on its resources. According to Barney (1991: 101), firm 
resources include “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.” Hence, IC, HC, and 
CG represent these resources. 
 
Second, there are several theoretical links between EFI and firm performance that in 
turn drive the yield on stock and the market value of a firm. For IC, Crépon et al. (1998), 
develop a structural model that explains productivity by innovation output and innovation 
output by research investments. Crépon et al. (1998: 115) find that “firm innovation 
output, as measured by patent numbers or” innovative “sales, rises with its research 
effort and with the demand pull and technology indicators, either directly or indirectly 
through their effects on research.” Further, “firm productivity correlates positively with a 
higher innovation output, even when controlling for the skill” composition “of labor as well 
as for physical capital intensity.”  
 
A theoretical link between superior human resource management and positive financial 
outcomes is e. g. given by Guest (1997). Becker and Huselid (1998: 53) focus on the 
“potential of a high performance work system to serve as an inimitable resource 
supporting the effective implementation of corporate strategy and the attainment of 
operational goals.” They provide a model that shows how the market value of a company 
is driven by human resource management.  
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According to the principal agent theory, agency costs emerge due to a conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers (see Jensen and Meckling (1976)). 
Agency costs can result in lower cash flows to the shareholders (see La Porta et al. 
(2000)). CG is a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves 
or are protected against expropriation by managers. Although agency costs cannot be 
completely eliminated, they can be reduced by good CG.  
 
Based on theoretical models and empirical studies, the link between a specific EFI 
category and corporate performance is not always positive. Chan et al. (2001: 2432), for 
example, argue that many R&D intensive firms have few tangible assets and “their 
prospects are tied to the success of new, untested technologies and hence are highly 
unpredictable.” Third, we assume that in our study superior (inferior) rated EFI is a 
source of competitive advantage (disadvantage), as the ratings we use are based on 
criteria for assessing the competitive position of a company resulting from its CG, HC, 
and IC. Fourth, it is important to mention that the EFI we include in the models is 
predominantly not reflected by the accounting system by design and thereby contains 
additional information content. The extra-financial ratings impose heavy weight on the 
change of criteria. It will take time for the accounting system to absorb this new 
information. Finally, a company will earn an additional positive (negative) residual 
income when it has a competitive advantage (disadvantage). Since the EFI in period t 
contains additional information about the competitive advantage in t+1, we use this 
information to predict the residual income of period t+1. This logic applies also for 
periods after t+1. Hence, it is our hypothesis that future residual income can be better 
predicted in a linear information model by considering EFI. If this hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, the fundamental value of a company which is based on future RI should be 
able to be more precisely determined. 
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When capital markets are efficient in the semistrong form (see Fama (1991)), and EFI is 
relevant and available to market participants, we expect this information to be reflected 
in present stock prices. We explicitly estimate linear information dynamics similar to 
those proposed by Ohlson (1995) to determine fundamental market values.1 Thereby, 
we modify three commonly used empirical versions of the Ohlson (1995) model by 
additionally including EFI in the linear information model (LIM). As proxies for EFI we 
consider CG, HC and IC ratings based on publicly available information only. We 
analyse a model that is based on Ohlson (1995) but does not include the “other 
information” variable ν  in the LIM (model Ia). This model has already been empirically 
implemented by Myers (1999), for example. In a second model, we additionally include 
EFI in our LIM (Ib). Model IIa is based on Ohlson (2001) who shows how to account for 
“other information” ν  by assuming that next period expected earnings are observable 
with the help of analysts’ earnings forecasts. “The term ν  summarizes information that is 
captured in a firm’s stock price because of its ability to predict future abnormal earnings, 
but is not yet reflected in the firm’s financial statement” (Hand and Landsman (1998: 2)). 
The “other information” variable is calculated based on earnings expectations and 
current accounting data. Model IIa was tested by Dechow et al. (1999) and Pfeil (2003), 
for example. To determine whether EFI has information content beyond analysts’ 
forecasts and accounting figures, we develop our own model IIb. As stated by Callen 
and Segal (2005: 409), “studies by Dechow et al. (1999), Myers (1999), Callen and 
Morel (2001) and Morel (2003) provide extensive empirical evidence that the Ohlson 
(1995) model is of limited empirical validity.” One reason for these results can be seen in 
the shortcoming of the Ohlson (1995) model to account for conservative accounting. For 
this reason we implement also model IIIa based on Choi, O’Hanlon and Pope (2006), in 
short COP (2006), who modified the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model to test whether it 
can reduce problems related to unconditional conservatism. This model was also 
implemented by Henschke et al. (2007). Finally, our model IIIb is based on model IIIa 
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and additionally includes EFI. Since the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model is a 
generalisation of the Ohlson (1995) model, we call model III a specification of Ohlson 
(1995) in this study.2 
 
We explore the following research questions for our sample of European firms: 
1.  Does a positive influence of EFI on next period’s residual income exist? Can the 
residual income of the next period be better explained when EFI is considered? 
2.  Which of our different models is best in explaining current market prices? Does 
EFI make a difference? 
3.  Which of the considered models is most appropriate for predicting future stock 
performance by identifying under- and overvalued companies? Again, does EFI 
make a difference? 
 
The major contribution of this study is to test whether EFI is relevant in explaining 
current stock prices and future stock returns. We therefore enhance existing linear 
information models by integrating EFI and testing the models’ ability to explain current 
stock prices and predict future stock performance. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. The basic Ohlson (1995) model is summarized in section 2. In 
section 3, we present the empirical versions of our linear information models. Section 4 
describes EFI as well as employed financial and accounting data. In section 5, we test 
our hypotheses and present the results. Section 6 concludes our study. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Background  
 
This section summarizes the basic assumptions of the Ohlson model.3 The model is 
based on the residual income valuation model. Ohlson (1995) creates an analytical 
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specification of basic residual income valuation models enabling researchers to calculate 
future abnormal earnings and as a consequence the present value of a firm. For this 
reason, we present the residual income valuation framework and then the linear 
information dynamics introduced by Ohlson (1995). 
 
Residual Income Model 
 
First, the present value of expected dividends assumption is applied. It states that the 
firm value tV  is the present value of expected future dividends τ+td : 
 
[ ]
∑
∞
=τ
τ
τ+
=
1
tt
t R
dEV . 
 
( )⋅tE  is the expectation operator, conditional on available information at time t and R is 
the discount factor 1 plus the cost of capital r. 
 
The next assumption is the clean surplus relation which states that tbv , the book value 
of equity at the end of period t, can be calculated by adding the earnings tx  of period t  
to the book value at the end of period t-1 and subtracting the net dividends td  of  
period t: 
 tt1tt dxbvbv −+= − . 
 
The residual income RI  of period t is defined as 
 1ttt bvrxRI −⋅−=  
where r  is the cost of capital. 
 
Combining the three equations above yields the basic equation of RI valuation: 
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Next, we present Ohlson’s (1995) framework for predicting future RI. 
 
Ohlson’s Information Dynamics 
 
The linear information dynamics, also called the linear information model, basically 
consists of two equations in the Ohlson (1995) version. The first one predicts the RI of 
the next period based on the RI of the present period and based on “other information” 
tν . The “other information“ is defined as value relevant information that can be observed 
at the end of period t but is not yet captured by the accounting system which means that 
the information is not reflected by tx  and tbv . It is assumed that RI is only temporary, 
since a firm is not likely to earn abnormal returns in perpetuity in a competitive economy. 
For this reason, the equation includes a persistence parameter ω  which is assumed to 
lie between zero and one: 
 1t,1tt1t RIRI ++ ε+ν+⋅ω= .4 
 
The second equation specifies the development of the ”other information“: 
 1t,2t1t ++ ε+ν⋅γ=ν . 
 
Since the influence of “other information” on RI is assumed to be temporary, the values 
of γ  should also lie between zero and one. ω  and γ  are assumed to be fixed 
parameters over time. The disturbance terms 1t,1 +ε  and 1t,2 +ε  are unpredictable, zero-
mean variables. Combining the two equations above delivers a forecast of expected 
future RI. 
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Ohlson (1995) derives the following closed form valuation function combining the linear 
information dynamics with the RI valuation framework: 
 
 t2t1tt RIbvV ν⋅α+⋅α+=  
 
where 
 
 
ω−
ω
=α
R1
  and  ( )( )γ−ω−=α RR
R
2 . 
 
Next, we modify this model to include EFI and to allow for conservative accounting as 
well.  
 
 
3. Empirical Versions of Linear Information Models 
 
In this section, we present six different information dynamics and the price equations 
that they imply. Basically, we present three different models each with two different 
specifications a and b. Version b of each model additionally incorporates EFI. We use 
three different kinds of EFI: CG, HC, and IC.5  
 
The first LIM is based on RI and thus similar to the Ohlson (1995) model without “other 
information”. Model II is based on model I but additionally incorporates analysts’ 
forecasts. Model III is based on COP (2006) considering conservatism in the spirit of 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995).  
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Linear Information Model I 
 
We first present the Ohlson model without “other information”. This model assumes that 
expectations of future RI are based on information about current RI only (abbreviated as 
Ia-O for the Ohlson model) or on information about current RI plus EFI (abbreviated as 
Ib-OCG, Ib-OHC, and Ib-OIC for the Ohlson model, including the respective kind of EFI). 
RI is assumed to change rather slowly over a longer period, since a competitive 
advantage or disadvantage is unlikely to cease to exist or to occur suddenly. Economic 
intuition concerning version b is that the EFI variable (ef) to a large extent is not reflected 
by the present equity book value and earnings. But it is publicly known and thus it can be 
better used to predict future RI.  
 
The linear dynamics for version Ib is: 
 
1t,1t2t11t efRIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+⋅ω= ,      (1) 
1t,2t11t efef ++ ε+⋅β= ,        (2) 
 
where 1t,k +ε  with 1k =  and 2 are zero mean error terms and tef  represents the different 
kinds of EFI at period t. For tef , we include the variables ,cgt  ,hc t  and tic  for the CG, 
HC, and IC information, respectively.  
 
This model implies the valuation equation: 
 
t2t1tt efRIbvV ⋅α+⋅α+= ,       (3) 
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where 
 
)R( 1
1
1
ω−
ω
=α   and  ( ).R)R(
R
11
2
2 β−ω−
⋅ω
=α  
 
In the above equations, 1ω  is the persistence parameter for abnormal earnings. In a 
competitive market, 1ω  is assumed to be smaller than one since a competitive 
advantage is assumed to erode in a competitive environment. Thus, competition will 
reduce RI towards zero. It is assumed to be non-negative since a competitive advantage 
will not induce a competitive disadvantage in the next period: .10 1 <ω≤  ef is assumed 
to trend to zero over time because an advantage or disadvantage based on extra-
financials should also be transitory in a competitive environment. Thus, we assume 1β  to 
lie between zero and one. Further, the parameter 2ω  should be positive because we 
assume that superior EFI is an indicator for a competitive advantage. 2ω  is not 
necessarily smaller than 1. This is because ef  is trending towards zero: 10 1 <β≤  and 
.02 >ω  Version Ia is a reduced form of Ib: As tef  is zero, t2 ef⋅α  vanishes in the 
valuation equation (3).  
 
Linear Information Model II 
 
As for model I, we examine two different versions of LIM II. However, for LIM II we 
explicitly describe both versions (IIa without and IIb with EFI) as they are a little bit more 
involved. In LIM IIa, we follow a procedure for calculating the “other information“ variable 
tν  that was suggested by Ohlson (2001). The basic idea of the approach is that future 
RI is forecasted on the basis of current RI and “other information“ using analysts’ 
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earnings forecasts. Prior studies following this approach include Dechow et al. (1999), 
Hand and Landsman (2005), as well as McCrae and Nilsson (2001).  
 
LIM IIa (abbreviated as IIa-OA for the Ohlson model including analysts’ forecasts) is 
based on the following information dynamics: 
 
 1t,1tt11t RIRI ++ ε+ν+⋅ω= ,       (4) 
1t,2t11t ++ ε+ν⋅γ=ν .        (5) 
 
Ohlson (2001) suggests measuring tν  as the difference between the expected RI for 
period t+1 based on market’s expectations in period t and the forecast based on the 
current period RI only: 
[ ] t11ttt RIRIE ⋅ω−=ν + . 
 
In line with prior studies we use for the period t conditional expectation of period t+1 
earnings the consensus analysts’ forecast of period t+1 earnings, denoted tf :6 
[ ] ttat1tt bvrffRIE ⋅−==+ . 
 
Then tν  can be measured as: 
t1
a
tt RIf ⋅ω−=ν . 
 
This means that the “other information”, tν , is the difference between abnormal analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and the expected residual income in t+1, based on the linear 
information dynamics of model Ia. 
 
 13 
LIM IIa implies the following valuation equation: 
 
 t3t1tt RIbvV ν⋅α+⋅α+= ,       (6) 
 
where 
 
 
1
1
1 R ω−
ω
=α   and  ( )( )113 RR
R
γ−ω−
=α . 
 
The parameter value of 1γ  depends on 1ω  since the latter is used for calculating tν .  
1ω  is smaller than one in a competitive market and the influence of tν  is also assumed 
to trend to zero: ,10 1 <ω≤  and .10 1 <γ≤  1t,k +ε  with 1k =  and 2 are zero mean error 
terms. 
 
LIM IIb is a combination of LIM Ib and IIa. We implement this model to examine the 
value of EFI when analysts’ forecasts are already considered in the model (abbreviated 
as IIb-OACG, IIb-OAHC, and IIb-OAIC for the Ohlson model, including analysts’ 
forecasts and the respective kind of EFI). The notion is that extra-financials contain 
relevant information beyond RI and analysts’ forecasts.  
 
LIM IIb is based on the following information dynamics: 
 
 1t,1tt2t11t efRIRI ++ ε+ν+⋅ω+⋅ω=       (7) 
 1t,2t11t ++ ε+ν⋅γ=ν         (5) 
1t,3t11t efef ++ ε+⋅β= ,        (2) 
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where 1t,k +ε  with 3,2,1k =  are zero mean error terms and tef  represents EFI. Equation 
(5) reminds us of LIM IIa and equation (2) of LIM Ib. 
 
Here, we estimate the “other information” variable, tν , as the difference between the 
expected RI based on market’s expectations in period t of RI for t+1 and the anticipated 
RI based on the current period RI plus the effect of EFI:  
[ ]t2t1att efRIf ⋅ω+⋅ω−=ν . 
 
Thus, in this model, tν  is information known to the market concerning RI of period t+1 
by using analysts’ forecasts minus information known by extrapolating historical 
accounting figures and EFI. In both versions, IIa and IIb, the expected RI for period t+1 
is atf . However, from period t+2 on, the information dynamics yields different forecasts 
for RI. 
 
This model implies the following valuation equation: 
 
 t3t2t1tt efRIbvV ν⋅α+⋅α+⋅α+= ,      (8) 
 
where 
 
 
1
1
1 R ω−
ω
=α ,  ( )( )11
2
2 RR
R
β−ω−
⋅ω
=α   and  ( )( )113 RR
R
γ−ω−
=α . 
 
1ω  will be smaller than one in a competitive market and the influence of tef  and tν  is 
also assumed to trend to zero. Thus, 1β  and 1γ  are between zero and one. 2ω  is 
assumed to be positive: .0,10,10,10 2111 >ω<γ≤<β≤<ω≤   
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Linear Information Model III 
 
Most studies testing the Ohlson (1995) or the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model find that 
the estimates of firm values are negatively biased.7 The negative bias of the Ohlson 
model is explained in the literature by the violation of the assumption of unbiased 
accounting and thus by the shortcoming to allow for conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. The Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model incorporates a conservatism 
coefficient to account for unconditional conservatism. In contrast to their model, this 
coefficient is negative in most empirical studies.8 Thus, the model is not able to capture 
unconditional conservatism in an appropriate way. Choi, O’Hanlon and Pope (2006), for 
short COP (2006), modified the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model to mitigate this 
problem. COP (2006: 76) argue that, if the “assumed dependence between book value 
and expected future RI does not reflect information about the mean” of “other 
information” tν , “this characterization of accounting conservatism will not capture the 
anticipated unwinding of conservatism that is implied when average RI in the estimation 
period is negative and average OI is positive” because “intrinsic value estimates contain 
a conservatism-related bias”. 
 
We test the COP (2006) modification in LIM IIIa (abbreviated as IIIa-COP) and 
additionally include EFI in LIM IIIb (abbreviated as IIIb-COPCG, IIIb-COPHC, and IIIb-
COPIC for the COP (2006) model, including the respective kind of EFI). The logic for 
including EFI is as already mentioned above: we argue that it contains additional 
information besides accounting figures and analysts’ forecasts.  
 
LIM IIIb has the following linear dynamics: 
 
 1t,1tt2t1t01t efRIbvRI ++ ε+ν+⋅ω+⋅ω+⋅ω= ,    (9) 
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1t,2t1t bvGbv ++ ε+⋅= ,        (10) 
1t,3t1t01t bv ++ ε+ν⋅γ+⋅γ=ν ,       (11) 
1t,4t11t efef ++ ε+⋅β= ,        (2) 
 
where 1t,k +ε  with ,3,2,1k =  and 4 are zero mean error terms. 0ω  and 0γ  are 
conservatism parameters. The persistence parameters 111 and, γβω  are assumed to 
have the following range: 10 1 <ω≤ , 10 1 <β≤  and 10 1 <γ≤ . G ( )RG1 <≤  represents 
one plus the growth rate of book value. In equation (9), tef  is zero for LIM IIIa and 
equation (2) also disappears. 
 
We calculate tν  as the difference between the expected RI based on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for period t+1 and the expectation of RI for period t+1 based on the RI 
dynamics. Since the RI dynamics varies between LIM IIIa and IIIb, tν  varies between 
the two versions. For version a (this is the model without EFI), tν  is  
( )t1t0att RIbvf ⋅ω+⋅ω−=ν  
and for version b (with EFI) it is 
( ).efRIbvf t2t1t0att ⋅ω+⋅ω+⋅ω−=ν  
 
As in models IIa and IIb, the expected RI for period t+1 is atf  for models IIIa and IIIb, too. 
From period t+2 on, the information dynamics yield different forecasts for RI. In order to 
illustrate the different RI dynamics, the evolution of expected RI is shown for the 
company Saint Gobain in figures 1a and 1b. 
 
LIM IIIb implies the following valuation equation: 
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( ) t3t2t1t54t efRIbv1V ν⋅α+⋅α+⋅α+⋅α+α+= ,    (12) 
 
where 
 
1
1
1 R ω−
ω
=α ,  ( )( )11
2
2 RR
R
β−ω−
⋅ω
=α ,  ( )( )113 RR
R
γ−ω−
=α ,  
( )( )GRR
R
1
0
4
−ω−
⋅ω
=α ,  and  ( )( )( )GRRR
R
11
0
5
−γ−ω−
⋅γ
=α . 
 
LIM IIIa does not contain the term t2 ef⋅α  in (12).  
 
 
4. Data Sample and Extra-Financial Information 
 
Financial information is obtained from Thomson Financial Datastream and EFI is 
represented by ratings from The Value Group.9 The ratings are based on information 
published by the rated companies. The initial sample consists of 150 companies of the 
EURO STOXX with the largest free float market capitalization for the time period 2004-
2005. We do not consider EFI before 2004 and also do not include companies with less 
free float market capitalization due to poor public EFI data availability. In line with prior 
studies, we exclude all financial companies that have a SIC code starting with 6 (46 
companies). We furthermore eliminate companies when only preferred stock is listed 
because we value common stock (2 companies). We also delete firms with a negative 
book value since their future prospects are uncertain and companies with missing 
financial data (14 companies). Finally, companies with missing ratings are excluded (29 
companies). Thus, we end up with 59 companies in our sample. 
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We use Datastream to collect annual accounting data on earnings, book values of 
equity, and value added which we define as earnings before interest and taxes plus 
salaries. Furthermore, it is important to note that extraordinary items are not stated 
separately under IFRS. For this reason, we calculate RI based on net income available 
to common. Earlier empirical research (e. g. Dechow et al. (1999), Myers (1999)) uses 
earnings before extraordinary items because extraordinary items are nonrecurring, and 
so their inclusion is unlikely to enhance the prediction of RI. However, our approach 
corresponds with the Ohlson (1995) model based on a clean surplus accounting system. 
Further, it must be mentioned that in IFRS, as well as in US-GAAP, the clean surplus 
relation is violated to some extent.10 We use restated data from Thomson Financial 
(restatement reason code: change in GAAP followed) for the year 2004, when a firm 
changed from local GAAP to IFRS in 2005. The restated book value of equity for the 
year 2003 that we need to calculate the RI for the year 2004 is hand-collected from the 
year 2005 annual report when a firm was switching to IFRS.11 From 2005 on, no firm 
applied local GAAP. So we assure that all accounting data used in this study are based 
on IFRS or US-GAAP. A one year ahead median earnings forecast from I/B/E/S is also 
obtained via Datastream. We take the forecasts of the Thursday before the third Friday 
of the sixth month after the end of a firm’s fiscal year. With this procedure, we assure 
that accounting information is in fact available to analysts. Also, The Value Group ratings 
are based on information publicly available six months after the fiscal year. 
 
We obtain the free float market value, stock prices and the return index of the EURO 
STOXX from Thomson Financial for the years 2000-2007 and the ten year Euro 
benchmark bond interest rate which is used as the risk free interest rate for the years 
2002-2005 for the linear information models. As opposed to a price index, we use a net 
return index of the EURO STOXX because there is no total return index of the EURO 
STOXX. Valuation figures as well as stock prices are adjusted for stock splits. The latter 
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are also adjusted for dividends distributed during the six months following the end of the 
fiscal year where appropriate. The predictive power of the models is tested using buy-
and-hold total stock returns and the Sharpe Ratio. The risk free interest rate for the 
Sharpe Ratio is proxied by the one year German treasury bond issued at 2006-06-30. 
 
We obtain three different extra-financial ratings from The Value Group: (i) Corporate 
governance (CG): Assessment of the adoption of processes and rules for solid 
governance which assure that shareholders receive an adequate return on their 
investment. (ii) Human capital (HC): Assessment of how a firm manages to establish an 
environment and processes so that employees deliver their optimum to the firm‘s 
success. (iii) Innovation capital (IC): Assessment of a firm’s current innovation success 
as well as its efforts to assure future capabilities for innovation. According to The Value 
Group, all data used to generate the extra-financial ratings are published by the 
companies in annual, social and other company reports. This distinguishes the ratings 
used in this study from other available ratings in this field where also private information 
is processed. The ratings are based on scoring models that primarily incorporate 
quantitative data. The HC rating, for example, is based on the category Training and on 
the category Motivation/Retention/Satisfaction. Both consist of several indicators. 
Training e. g assesses the annual number of training days per employee, especially the 
change over time. Motivation/Retention/Satisfaction examines the change in annual 
employee turnover and the change in the number of employees, for example. Each 
rating evaluates companies on a scale from 0 to 10 with 10 as best rating score. Neither 
market value nor book value or RI, i. e. accounting or processed accounting figures, 
enters the ratings. Figure 2 presents histograms for the rating values of the three 
different ratings in the year 2005. 
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Table 1 depicts the Pearson correlation coefficients for the different extra-financial 
ratings of the years 2004 and 2005. As can be seen from the table, the correlation 
between the same rating categories of 2004 and 2005 is always positive (although not 
significantly different from zero for HC). Focusing on the different ratings, one can see 
that CG and HC ratings are generally negatively correlated whereas there is a positive 
correlation between CG and IC. The correlation between IC and HC ratings is generally 
positive with the exception of IC 2005 and HC 2005. Generally, the correlations between 
the different ratings are not statistically significantly different from zero (with the 
exception of IC 2005 and CG 2005). 
 
[Insert table 1 and figure 2 about here] 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports annual summary statistics. It is based on all observations for the 
included 59 EURO STOXX companies. The median return-on-equity is very high for the 
years 2004 and 2005 and there are almost no negative values for the return-on-equity in 
both years. This is due to the booming economic environment in Europe in both years. 
Thus, more than 80% of RI is positive using an equity cost of capital of 8.09% for 
calculating RI in 2004 and 7.39% in 2005.12 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
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Model Estimation 
 
In the following, we describe how the parameters needed for calculating the fundamental 
share price are estimated. We estimate the parameters for the different information 
dynamics above year-by-year cross-sectionally, since a firm-by-firm estimation does not 
make sense due to poor public EFI availability before 2004. 
 
The parameter 1ω  is estimated in the cross-sectional regression 
1tt101t RIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+ω=  for models Ia, IIa, and IIIa. For model IIIa, 0ω  is also estimated 
in this regression.  
 
For models Ib, IIb, and IIIb 1ω  and 2ω  are estimated from 
1tt2t101t efRIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+⋅ω+ω= . Depending on the model specification, tef  is ,cgt  thc  
or tic . In model IIIb, 0ω  is also estimated in this regression. To generate ef, we multiply 
the respective extra-financial rating13 by the value added of a firm which is defined as 
earnings before interest and taxes plus salaries. The value added is a financial ratio to 
assess the value creation potential of a firm. Thus, it is a proxy to asses a firm’s ability to 
take advantage of extra-financials. We use the value creation potential of the examined 
firms to transform their non-monetary ratings into a monetary variable. In our model, a 
superior extra-financial rating plus a high value added should generate a huge 
competitive advantage resulting in an additional RI.  
 
For models IIa and IIb, 1γ  is estimated from the cross-sectional regression 
1tt101t ++ ε+ν⋅γ+γ=ν  and for models IIIa and IIIb 0γ  is additionally estimated from this 
regression.  Be aware that 0γ  and 1γ  vary between the different versions of the models 
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because ν  is also different. For the b-versions of the three models, we estimate 1β  from 
1tt101t efef ++ ε+⋅β+β= . Again, tef  is ,cgt  thc  or tic . 
 
The book value growth parameter G in models IIIa and IIIb is estimated according to 
COP (2006) using book value data from year 2000 to 2005: 
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where N is the number of firms j in the sample and t is the respective year.14 Thereby, 
we estimate a G of 1.033. 
 
To mitigate the effect of outliers in the regressions for the above introduced linear 
information models, we omit the largest and smallest observation of each variable as in 
prior studies (e. g. McCrae and Nilsson (2001), who exclude the top and  
bottom 1%). To estimate the models we use the Euro benchmark bond interest rate as 
the risk free interest rate for year t and a uniform risk premium of 4%.15 Using time-
variant interest rates that do not vary across companies is a standard approach used by 
most studies in this strand of literature for calculating and discounting RI. As a 
consequence, the market portfolio return and the risk-free return move together. 
Henceforth, we name this discount rate constant as it is equal for all companies. 
Additionally, we use annually updated firm-specific discount rates to discount abnormal 
earnings with cross-sectional variations and use discount rates that vary across 
companies and time when calculating RI.16 Therefore, the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) is used to calculate firm- and time-specific cost of capital. Betas are based on 
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the slope of a regression of prior 48 monthly stock returns on the return of the EURO 
STOXX. We use simple returns on a monthly basis because we assume the returns to 
be normally distributed.17 The market risk premium is set to 4%.  
 
We estimate the market value of a firm on a per share basis.18 Unfortunately, the use of 
per share values does not adequately control for the effects of scale because shares 
come in different sizes. As shown by Barth and Kallapur (1996), the deflation of firm 
level data by the number of shares does not eliminate the coefficient bias arising from 
the omission of a scale factor. Brown et al. (1999) allude to this as well.19 For this 
reason, we additionally deflate all variables by the market value of equity per share as, 
for example, in Dechow et al. (1999), Gregory et al. (2005), and Pfeil (2003), in order to 
mitigate problems related to the scale effect.20 Since we estimate the RI regression 
cross-sectionally, the deflation is especially important in our study. Dechow et al. (1999), 
McCrae and Nilsson (2001), and Gregory et al. (2005) all show that a first order 
autoregressive process is generally sufficient to capture the persistence of RI for their 
data samples of US, Swedish and UK firms. Due to data restrictions, we cannot test 
whether a one year time lag is sufficient for EFI to be reflected in RI. Before turning to 
the results, we want to underline that two possible data problems (firms following US-
GAAP and selection bias) are addressed in the sensitivity analysis at the end of this 
section. We can confirm that the results presented here are not distorted. 
 
Test of Linear Information Models 
 
In the following section, we examine whether the parameters we estimate are in line with 
the theoretical values given by the above models. We address seven questions: (i) Is the 
autoregressive coefficient 1ω  for tRI  in the RI dynamics significantly different from the 
polar values zero and one? (ii) Is the intercept 0ω  significantly different from zero in the 
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RI dynamics? (iii) Is the RI dynamics, including EFI, more appropriate for explaining 
future RI? (iv) Are the parameters 2ω  for ,cgt  ,hc t  and tic  significantly positive in the RI 
dynamics? (v) Are the autoregressive coefficients 1β  for ,cgt  ,hc t  and tic  significantly 
different from the extreme values zero and one? (vi) Is the autoregressive coefficient 1γ  
for the variable ν  significantly different from the extreme values zero and one? (vii) Is 0γ  
significantly different from zero? 
 
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for the different specifications of the RI 
equations. Parameters are estimated in cross-sectional ordinary least squares 
regressions. As can be seen from Panel A and B in table 3, 1ω  is significantly positive in 
all model specifications for both, constant and firm-specific discount rates. The 
parameter 1ω  for tRI , estimated for the models Ia-O, IIa-OA, and IIIa-COP in Panel A 
can be compared to other studies. Our value obtained for constant discount  
rates (0.702) is slightly higher than the value obtained by Dechow et al. (1999) (0.62) 
and COP (2006) (0.490) for a sample of U.S. firms for the period from 1950-1995. This 
should be due to the short time window we analyse. Since 1ω  is in all equations smaller 
than one, it is in the expected range. The notion here is that a competitive advantage will 
persist for some time and competition will reduce the returns towards the cost of capital. 
In all RI regressions, 0ω  is statistically significantly different from zero.  
 
The adjusted R² of 30.9% in panel A for the regression of models Ia-O, IIa-OA, and  
IIIa-COP is in the range of McCrae and Nilsson (2001), who present an adjusted R²  
of 29.3% or Dechow et al. (1999) who obtain 34% in the regression. As can be seen 
from Panel A and B of table 3, the adjusted R² is highest for the RI regression including 
HC information for both, constant (35.5%) and firm-specific discount rates (39.9%), but 
the adjusted R² is lower for regressions including CG and IC than for the regression 
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without EFI. Further, the Akaike information criterion (not reported) is lowest - for 
constant and firm-specific discount rates - for the HC specification. However, the 
Schwarz criterion (not reported) is lowest for the regression without EFI. Nonetheless, 
the RI of the next period is well explained when the HC information is considered 
besides the RI of the current period. This cannot be claimed for CG or IC information.21 
 
We observe a statistically significant positive influence of HC on the RI of the next 
period. The confirms our hypothesis that HC provides a competitive advantage having a 
positive impact on future RI. We do not observe a statistically significant influence of CG 
or IC on the RI of the next period. When combining the different kinds of EFI in multiple 
RI regressions, we also cannot find a significant influence of the two ratings (regressions 
not reported). For this reason, we expect that CG and IC cannot contribute to explain 
current stock prices more accurately or to predict future stock returns. 
 
The parameters 1β  for the evolution of EFI, as shown in the autoregressions of panel C 
of table 3, are significantly different from zero for CG and IC. The relatively high values 
for CG and IC (0.618 and 0.866) indicate that next year EFI is well explained by the EFI 
of the current year. The relatively low value for 1β  of 0.203 for HC in combination with a 
low adjusted R² indicates that the information about HC is transitory and also that this 
rating comprises additional new information in the next period. 1β  is between zero and 
one and thus within the expected range for all EFI. In panel D of table 3, the change of 
tν  is estimated by the parameter 1γ . tν  is computed as t1att RIf ⋅ω=ν -  for model type II 
and as ( )t1t0att RIbvf ⋅ω+⋅ω=ν -  for model type III.22 As can be seen from panel D, the 
parameter 1γ  is neither for constant nor for firm-specific discount rates statistically 
significant. This does not hold prior research and is presumably attributable to the lack of 
time series data. However, 0γ  is always statistically significantly different from zero, 
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indicating that the parameter should be considered in a valuation model as done by COP 
(2006). Concerning the first research question, we find 1+tRI  is well explained by a model 
including tRI  and thc . CG and IC do not contribute to explain 1tRI + . The influence of the 
HC information is significantly positive. 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
Explanation of Current Stock Prices 
 
The second research question focuses on the ability of the different model specifications 
to explain current stock prices. Therefore, we calculate the fundamental values per 
shares (V) as described in the above linear information models. We compare V at the 
last day of fiscal year 2005 with the share price (P) at the last trading day of the month 
ending six months after the end of the fiscal year.23 Based on this, we determine 
valuation errors as done, for example, by Dechow et al. (1999). We calculate mean 
valuation errors as well as mean absolute and squared valuation errors based on V and 
P. Further, we test whether V is correlated with market value in the cross-section: 
( ) .0P,VCorr >  We calculate Pearson as well as Spearman correlation coefficients in 
order to better compare our results to prior research. The higher the correlation 
coefficients, the better a model is able to explain market value. 
 
The mean valuation errors for the year 2005 are presented in table 4. The valuation 
errors are calculated as: 
 
P
VPVE -= , 
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where P  is a firm’s stock price six months after the end of the fiscal year 2005 and V  is 
the estimated fundamental value for 2005. The absolute valuation error is VE=AVE  
and the squared valuation error is ( )²VE=SQVE . AVE  ensures that positive and 
negative valuation errors are not subtracted and SQVE  additionally gives more weight 
to valuation errors that are larger in absolute values. 
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
As can be seen from table 4, the models I and II have a mean positive VE showing that 
they underestimate the stock price on average. This is in keeping with almost all prior 
studies (an exception is the inflation adjusted model of Gregory et al. (2005)). The model 
type III based on COP (2006) overestimates the stock price as indicated by the negative 
mean valuation errors. All the values for VE are quite large in absolute values compared 
to other studies such as Dechow et al. (1999) or McCrae and Nilsson (2001). McCrae 
and Nilsson, for example, report a VE of 0.34 for the Ohlson (1995) model not including 
“other information” that is equivalent to model Ia.  
 
Our results concerning AVE and SQVE are comparable to Dechow et al. (1999) and 
Gregory et al. (2005) for models I and II. McCrae and Nilsson (2001) report an AVE of 
0.49 and an SQVE of 0.33 on average in a model comparable to our model Ia-O for their 
sample of Swedish companies for the years 1970-1997. Like COP (2006), we observe a 
larger AVE for IIIa-COP than for IIa-OA. In our case, the AVE in model IIIa-COP is 
tremendously higher than the AVE of model IIa (AVE for constant discount rates:  
IIIa-COP = 0.617; IIa-OA = 0.425). In COP (2006), it rises from 0.453 to only 0.484. 
Since the valuation errors are even more extreme for the different specifications of IIIb, 
model types I and II do a better job in explaining market values although we do not 
observe an undervaluation problem for model type III. 
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Focusing on model type I, we find that Ib-OHC is dominating the other three versions of 
the model in explaining current stock prices for constant and firm-specific discount rates. 
For model II, IIb-OAHC is best and for model III, IIIa-COP dominates the other 
specifications for both discount rate specifications. Comparing the three models with 
each other, we find that valuation errors are smallest for model type II. Thus, a 
combination of analysts’ forecasts and HC information seems to be most appropriate for 
explaining current stock prices. 
 
Next, we examine the correlation between the stock prices P and the intrinsic values V 
calculated by the models. Table 5 presents the Pearson and the Spearman correlation 
coefficients for constant and firm-specific discount rates. The correlation coefficients are 
highest for model IIb-OAHC. This again indicates that combining analysts’ forecasts with 
HC information is an appropriate model for explaining the current price. The correlation 
coefficients are quite high in general. McCrae and Nilsson (2001) report an average 
Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.70 over the years 1970-1997 for the Ohlson model 
not including “other information”, and 0.74 for a model incorporating analysts’ forecasts.  
 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
Generally, our evidence indicates that model IIb-OAHC is best suited for explaining 
stock prices. Using a nonparametric signed rank test, we also test the null hypothesis 
that the median of VE is zero for the different models. We reject the null hypothesis at 
the 1 percent level for all models. We can observe an undervaluation problem for models 
I and II and a severe overvaluation problem for model type III. As argued by  
Henschke et al. (2007: 4), the failure of model type III to reduce inaccuracy for the whole 
sample might be “the consequence of forcing the model to value firms with different 
degrees of conservatism on the basis of the same conservatism coefficient”. They find 
 29 
that valuation inaccuracy is markedly reduced when LIM parameters are estimated 
separately according to market to book deciles. Gassen et al. (2006) investigate the 
interaction of conditional conservatism with unconditional conservatism and income 
smoothing for 23 developed equity markets over the time period 1990-2003.  
Gassen et al. (2006: 557) find that “differences in income smoothing are sufficient to 
explain the different levels of conditional conservatism between legal regimes.” Further, 
the accounting quality in terms of the accrual persistence, the estimation error in the 
accrual process and earnings management as described by Givoly et al. (2008), is likely 
to vary between different countries. Soderstrom and Sun (2007: 675) argue that “cross-
country differences in accounting quality are likely to remain following IFRS adoption” in 
the EU. This is due to the “overall institutional setting, including the legal and political 
system of the countries in which the firm” reside. However, we cannot control for 
differences in accounting quality due to a small sample size combined with a short time 
period. Also in line with Henschke et al. (2007), we observe that fundamental values V of 
model type III are very sensitive to the difference between the growth of book value G-1 
and the discount rate r. Since firm-specific discount rates are often close to G minus 1, 
we observe that stock prices are poorly explained by model III when it is implemented 
with firm-specific discount rates. Next, we test whether the models are useful in 
predicting stock returns. 
 
Prediction of Stock Performance 
 
If the models incorporate relevant information that is not reflected by share prices six 
months after the end of the fiscal year, we can expect that the models are suitable for 
identifying under- and overvalued companies. Thus, we analyse whether the values 
implied by the valuation models are able to predict future stock performance. Following 
Dechow et al. (1999), Frankel and Lee (1998), and McCrae and Nilsson (2001), we 
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conduct a portfolio approach. Stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based on the V/P 
ratios six months after the end of the fiscal year 2005. Lower deciles consist of stocks 
that are overpriced relative to the fundamental value and higher deciles consist of 
underpriced stocks.24 Overpriced stocks are expected to yield lower future returns than 
underpriced stocks. The portfolios are formed on the last trading day of June in 2006 
and the performance of each portfolio is observed over the next twelve months.25 Since 
all information used is available at the end of June 2006 this is a tradable strategy.  
Table 6 presents the portfolio decile results for constant and firm-specific discount rates 
as well as the hedge portfolio return defined as the difference in return between firms in 
the highest and lowest decile portfolios (P10 - P1). 
 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
 
The highest hedge return is generated by model Ib-OHC. It is the only model for which 
the median stock return of P10 is significantly higher than for P1 when using both, 
constant and firm-specific discount rates. A positive hedge return is generated by all 
models except for IIIa-COP and IIIb-COPHC when implemented with firm-specific 
discount rates. This means investors would have earned money by short-selling shares 
in the P1 portfolio and buying shares of the P10 portfolio in all but these two 
specifications. In line with prior studies, we find that the average return is not steadily 
increasing from P1 to P10 for the different models.  
 
Like Dechow et al. (1999), we find for models I and II that incorporating analysts’ 
forecasts increases the models’ ability to explain contemporaneous stock prices 
whereas models ignoring this information tend to be better predictors of future stock 
returns. McCrae and Nilsson (2001), do not find significant differences between the most 
extreme portfolios for eleven yearly portfolio returns for models equivalent to Ia and IIa. 
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However, in contrast with our findings and Dechow et al. (1999), McCrae and Nilsson 
(2001) find that model IIa tends to be better in predicting stock returns than Ia. 
 
Since the portfolio analysis above does not capture different risk characteristics of the 
stocks, we also test whether the median reward-to-variability ratio developed by  
Sharpe (1966), is higher for P10 portfolios compared to P1 portfolios for the one year 
time period starting at the end of June 2006. The Sharpe Ratio (SR) is calculated 
according to 
 
σ
−
=
fs rrSR  
 
where sr  is the return of a share, fr  is the risk free return, and σ  is the volatility of the 
share returns.26 sr  is the one year buy-and-hold stock return, fr  is proxied by the one 
year German treasury bond rate (since an adequate one year European bond rate is not 
available) that is 3.15% at the end of June 2006, and σ  is calculated using 60 monthly 
returns starting in July 2002. As can be seen from table 7, model Ib-OHC is the only 
model for which the median SR of P10 is statistically significantly higher than the median 
SR of P1 for both, constant and firm-specific discount rates. This confirms that model  
Ib-OHC, which is based on the Ohlson (1995) model and includes HC information but no 
analysts’ forecasts, is suited for identifying under- and overvalued companies. The 
median SR is higher for P10 portfolios than for P1 portfolios for all our valuation models.  
 
[Insert table 7 about here] 
 
For the observed time period, model IIb-OAHC is best in explaining market values and 
model Ib-OHC is best in identifying under- and overvalued companies and thus for 
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predicting one period ahead stock returns and risk adjusted stock performance. This 
indicates that the HC information includes information beyond fundamental accounting 
information and analysts’ forecasts. We do not find evidence that CG or IC do 
systematically improve or worsen models’ ability to explain the current stock prices or to 
predict future stock returns. This is not surprising as both types of EFI do not contribute 
to explain future RI, as shown above. Model type II, including analysts’ forecasts seems 
most appropriate for explaining current stock prices. This indicates that analysts’ 
forecasts are reflected in prices after a short period of time. Whereas for investors who 
want to generate abnormal returns in the year after all necessary information is available 
to the market, it is useful to base the investment decision on model Ib-OHC including HC 
information but no analysts’ forecasts. Further, we find that model I is better in identifying 
under- and overvalued companies and model II is better in explaining current stock 
prices when the models are implemented with firm-specific discount rates instead of 
constant discount rates. In the next section, we will analyse the robustness of our 
results. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis  
 
This section summarizes the findings for sensitivity tests conducted to evaluate the 
robustness of the above results. 
 
We identify two possible concerns related to our study. First, we have nine companies 
implementing US-GAAP in our sample. Second, we see the possibility of selection bias 
arising by the exclusion procedure of firms which is described in section 4. To control for 
the first problem, we implemented several regressions with US-GAAP and interaction 
dummies. Since these dummies are not statistically significant at any usual significance 
level and the estimated parameters are not materially changed, we report the study 
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without these dummy-variables. Due to converging tendencies of IFRS and US-GAAP, it 
is comprehensible that there is not a significant difference in our results based on the 
accounting standard. 
 
We address the problem of a potential selection bias by implementing the two-stage 
model of Heckman (1979). We assume the reader is familiar with this model. For an 
introduction, see Wooldridge (2002: 562-6) or Li and Prabhala (2007). Since the Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR), is never statistically significant at any usual significance level in the 
regressions of the second step, the null of no selection bias cannot be rejected. In this 
section, we briefly outline the basic results of the two-stage model. In the first step, a 
probit model is used to estimate the likelihood for the largest 150 EURO STOXX 
companies (without financial companies) to be included in the sample: 
 
j3j2j10j GAAP_localGAAP_US)mvfflog(ins ⋅δ+⋅δ+⋅δ+δ= . 
 
The variable jins  is coded 1, if a firm j is in the sample and zero otherwise. )mvfflog( j  is 
the natural logarithm of the free float market value (divided by 1.000.000) at the end of 
the year 2004. The variables jGAAP_US  and jGAAP_local  denote the accounting 
standard followed in the year 2004. We refrain from including country or industry 
dummies in the probit regression due to multicollinearity problems. The results from 
estimating the probit model are depicted in table 8. The highly significant positive 
coefficient of )mvfflog( j  indicates that a firm with a larger free float market capitalization 
is more likely included in the sample. This is appealing since the reporting quality of 
larger companies is assumed to be better. The positive coefficient concerning the  
US-GAAP dummy is explained by the fact that these companies usually do not switch 
the accounting standard followed during the period of interest. Some firms are excluded 
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from the sample because they switch from local GAAP in 2004 to IFRS in 2005 and do 
not report restated accounting data for 2004. 
 
[Insert table 8 about here] 
 
In the second stage, we include the IMR calculated from the results of the first stage in 
all ordinary least squares regressions needed to calculate the above presented linear 
information models. These are all the regressions shown in table 3. We do not present 
the results for the regressions because the estimated parameters do not materially 
deviate from the parameters shown in table 3 and IMR is never statistically significant. 
As a consequence, the results concerning the models’ ability to explain current stock 
prices and the models’ ability to identify under- and overvalued companies yield the 
same conclusions when accounting for the selection bias. We also test for possible 
interactions between sample selection bias and the applied accounting standards, but 
again, the results are not materially different from the results shown above. 
 
As stated before, models IIIa and IIIb seem very sensitive to the spread between G and 
the discount rate r. For this reason, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with values for  
G = 1.00, 1.01, 1.02, 1.03, 1.04, and 1.05 and the constant discount rate r that is 7.39% 
in 2005. We observe that the average valuation error is negative with respect to all 
values of G for the different model specifications. Thus, on average, estimated values 
are higher than prices. With increasing G and thereby a decreasing spread between G 
minus one and the discount rate, the average valuation errors become more negative. 
Average AVE and SQVE increase with a higher G. SQVE is never smaller for model 
type III than for model IIb-OAHC. However, AVE is smaller in all specifications of model 
III for a G of 1.00. For a G larger than 1.01, AVE is always smaller than for model  
IIb-OAHC. Thus, for empirically reasonable values of G, model IIb-OAHC better explains 
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market values. The decile portfolios for model type III remain relatively stable with 
respect to G. P10 - P1 always yields a hedge portfolio return of 31.9% or 26.7%. The 
difference between the medians of the Sharpe Ratio for P10 and P1 is never statistically 
significant for any model type III. The results for firm-specific discount rates are similar 
as for constant discount rates. When implementing this analysis with firm-specific 
discount rates, some firms have to be excluded as the terminal value condition, i. e.  
G-1 < r, is violated. 
 
Although we are convinced that market value deflation is appropriate to mitigate a scale 
effect in the regressions, we additionally deflate by book value of equity. This follows the 
argument of COP that price-scaled data will cause prior prices to appear as an 
information variable in models IIIa and IIIb, if the 0ω  or 0γ  parameters are not zero. We 
obtain an adjusted R² of more than 50% for the regression 1tt101t RIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+ω=  and 
for the CG, HC, and IC specifications of 1tt2t101t efRIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+⋅ω+ω=  when scaling 
by book value of year t. We address this increase relative to market value deflation to 
the scale effect. The influence of scale is especially intensive in our study since we run 
cross-sectional regressions. In all regressions, 1ω  is close to one which is the models’ 
theoretical polar value, which contradicts prior empirical research. When implementing 
models IIIa and IIIb with book value scaled data, we obtain more negative average 
valuation errors. This can be explained by the high 1ω  values in combination with 
predominantly positive RI in our sample. So, on average, companies are even more 
overvalued by models IIIa and IIIb when the regressions are book value scaled. 
 
Due to poor public availability of extra-financial information before 2004, we do not 
calculate ,0ω  ,1ω  and 2ω  from the regression 1tt2t101t efRIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+⋅ω+ω=  based 
on 2003 and 2004 data. Consequently, we cannot calculate 2004ν  for models IIb and IIIb 
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necessary to calculate the gamma parameters. As described earlier, we implement the 
specifications of model type IIb with the 1γ  value of IIa and LIM IIIb with the values for 
0γ  and 1γ  from LIM IIIa. Here, we test the sensitivity of model IIb-OAHC with respect to 
the parameter 1γ : The question is whether the result that IIb-OAHC is best in explaining 
market values is subject to an 1γ  value that is not empirically observed. For this reason, 
we implement model IIb-OAHC for all theoretically possible values: 10 1 ≤γ≤ . We find 
that our results are not sensitive to 1γ . Implemented with constant discount rates,  
IIb-OAHC is best in explaining market prices in terms of the different kinds of mean 
valuation errors and the Pearson correlation for 1γ  values between zero and 0.876. 
When implemented with firm-specific discount rates, IIb-OAHC is best for 1γ  values 
between zero and 0.837. Since a 1γ  value larger than 0.837 is empirically very unlikely, 
it is robust to say that IIb-OAHC best explains market prices. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions, Limitations, and Perspectives 
 
This paper tests whether extra-financial information, that is, corporate governance, 
human capital, and innovation capital information, offers additional insights in explaining 
current stock prices and future stock returns for a sample of large EURO STOXX 
companies. For this purpose, we implement six different versions of the residual income 
valuation model based on Ohlson (1995) and COP (2006). 
 
We find that human capital information is useful in a model with linear information 
dynamics for explaining the residual income of the next period. Further, a company’s 
human capital quality positively influences the residual income of the next period, which 
we interpret as a source of competitive advantage. Including analysts’ forecasts 
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improves the models’ accuracy in explaining current stock prices. However, it does not 
systematically improve the models’ predictive power. These findings are in keeping with 
prior research. Concerning the models’ predictive strength, we find that a model 
including human capital information and no analysts’ forecasts is best in identifying 
under- and overvalued companies and thus in predicting future stock performance. This 
indicates that the human capital rating has relevant information content beyond analysts’ 
forecasts and accounting figures. This creates a noteworthy investment opportunity for 
investors. However, we do not find that corporate governance or innovation capital 
information enhance the models’ explanatory or predictive abilities. For our sample, we 
observe that models based on COP (2006) overcome the problem of undervaluation by 
considering conservative accounting. However, consistent with the findings of COP 
(2006), valuation accuracy is not improved with these models and the intrinsic value 
estimates generated by the models are highly volatile with respect to the growth rate of 
the book value.  
 
Our empirical study is subject to some important limitations. First, our findings are 
necessarily based on a small data sample consisting of companies with high free float 
market capitalization due to a limited EFI reporting activity of small and medium sized 
companies. For this reason, our results need not hold for smaller companies. Second, 
we are only able to analyze a short period of time and thus cannot determine whether 
our results are robust over time. Since smaller companies are on the verge of reporting 
more extra-financial information, these two constraints can be overcome by future 
research when longer time series will be available for extra-financial information. A third 
limitation is that we cannot consider different degrees of accounting quality in our 
research. Estimation procedures as proposed by Henschke et al. (2007) cannot be 
implemented due to a small sample size combined with a short time period. Finally, we 
assume a one year time lag to be appropriate for EFI to be reflected in the residual 
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income. We do not test longer lags due to data limitations. We cannot dismiss the 
possibility that major benefits of CG, HC, and IC take longer to materialize than one 
year’s time (see e. g. Chan et al. (2001) for R&D). However, as can be seen from the 
autoregressions of panel C in table 3, EFI - although eroding - is present in future 
periods, too. Thus, EFI also has an impact on future RI. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate how 
future expected RI differ from the basic models when EFI is additionally considered. 
 
The future of this research holds great promise in our opinion. More and more firms are 
beginning to provide extensive information on HC and other extra-financial information in 
their reports as they acknowledge its usefulness for investors and other stakeholders. 
Our research contributes in rendering a first assessment of its value impact. 
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1
  Many studies that are in the spirit of Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) do 
not explicitly incorporate linear information models. Among these are Frankel and  
Lee (1998), for example. 
2 
 Myers (1999) also incorporates information (order backlog) in the LIM that is not yet 
reflected by accounting figures. Hence, our models including EFI are in the spirit of Myers 
(1999). 
3
  For more information concerning the Ohlson model, we refer to  
Ohlson (1995) and the Lundholm (1995) tutorial. 
4
  For notational simplicity, we refrain in the following from writing an expectation operator 
when a variable is in the future of year t. 
5
  One might be inclined to implement a full model with all three rating variables 
simultaneously. However, as our empirical findings show, this does not convey any new 
information. 
6
  It must be emphasized that the market’s earnings expectations are not directly 
observable. Thus, analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts are only a proxy for the 
market’s earnings expectations. We do not follow approaches that correct analysts’ 
forecasts for estimation bias based on observable prior forecast errors. It is questionable 
whether rational forecasts can be obtained through mechanistic adjustments of analysts’ 
forecasts given that forecast errors are highly skewed empirically. Abarbanell and Lehavy 
(2003) demonstrate how widely held beliefs about systematic errors in analysts’ forecasts 
are not supported by their analysis of the distribution of forecast errors: perhaps the most 
prominent belief is that analysts generally produce optimistic forecasts.  
7
  See Dechow et al. (1999), Myers (1999), and Callen and Segal (2005). 
8
  Choi, O’Hanlon and Pope (2006) argue that, under reasonable assumptions, the 
coefficient must be negative when the mean residual income is negative during an 
empirical estimation using pooled cross-section and time-series data. We also see an 
additional explanation for the negative coefficient when it is estimated from this 
regression: 1t1t12t11101t bvRIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+⋅ω+ω= . Although the model implies that some 
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residual income should stem from conservative accounting and thus 12ω  should be 
positive, in a cross-sectional regression 12ω  can be negative. We argue that accounting 
conservatism varies between companies. We compare two identical companies A and B 
with only one distinction: Firm A has a higher degree of accounting conservatism than 
firm B. This means that tbv  is smaller for firm A. As a consequence, 1tRI +  is smaller for 
firm B since both companies have the same amount of earnings. Taking this effect into 
account, in a cross-sectional regression a negative 12ω  is explainable. 
9
 
 The Value Group is a Germany-based developer of financial products that uses its 
research about non-financial information in addition to the financial analysis as a basis for 
investment decisions. See http://www.thevaluegroup.de. 
10
  Isidro et al. (2006) examine empirically the valuation errors arising from violations of the 
clean surplus relationship in a residual income valuation framework for France, Germany, 
UK and the US. Except for the US, the study finds little evidence for such a relationship. 
11
  This is possible because when switching to IFRS, companies publish the statement of 
changes in equity under the new accounting standard for the last two years.  
12
  The equity cost of capital is based on the Euro benchmark bond interest rate of year t 
plus a general 4% risk premium. Working with firm-specific equity cost of capital based on 
the CAPM yields similar RI. 
13
  The respective extra-financial rating score with potential values from 0-10 is centred by 
subtracting the mean rating score of all companies from the actual value of a firm. Thus, 
a positive extra-financial rating indicates a competitive advantage in relation to the 
average firm. 
14
  Beginning with the year 2000 ensures book value data to be available for all companies 
in the sample. COP (2006) employ a longer history because they do not demand that 
book value data are available for the whole sample in all years. We correct for firm years 
with switches in accounting standards. 
15
  McCrae and Nilsson (2001) set the risk premium to 4% for Swedish companies.  
Diakité (2005) also sets the risk premium to 4% for the valuation of a French 
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telecommunication firm. His estimate is based on prior studies considering historical, 
implied and survey premia. 
16
  This approach follows the argument that it is more precise to adopt company-specific 
discount rates than to work with aggregate constant discount rates. See Beaver (1999), 
for example. 
17
  See Fama (1976: 30-5). 
18
  Ohlson (2000) shows that on a per share basis clean surplus will not generally hold if 
there are expected changes in shares outstanding. This would be a necessity for the 
residual income valuation formula to be valid. However, he also shows that a total equity 
approach does not work for firms planning to bring in new shareholders who derive a net 
benefit from their capital contributions. As there is no easy solution to this problem and to 
maintain consistency with prior studies we estimate the market value on a per share 
basis (see, for example, Dechow et al. (1999) or COP (2006)). 
19
  If a share with a high market price is added to a sample of shares with low market prices, 
this share will likely have a relatively high positive or negative value for RI in both periods 
compared to the other shares in a RI regression where 1tRI +  is the dependent and tRI  
the independent variable. Recalling the ordinary least squares optimization, it is likely that 
this will result in biased estimates. 
20
  Since COP (2006: 99) argue that the “use of price-scaled data will cause price to appear 
as an information variable in the associated valuation model, if the 0ω  and/or 0γ  
parameters are not zero”, we also scale by book value in the sensitivity analysis section.  
21 
 EFI can also influence the equity costs of capital (see Ashbaugh et al. (2004) for CG). We 
do not explicitly consider this effect in our models, as we use the standard CAPM to 
determine firm-specific discount rates. 
22 
 Since the quality of the extra-financial information before 2004 is objectionable, we do not 
calculate ,0ω ,1ω  and 2ω  from the regression 1tt2t101t efRIRI ++ ε+⋅ω+⋅ω+ω=  based 
on 2003 and 2004 data. As a consequence, we cannot calculate 2004ν  for models IIb and 
IIIb necessary to calculate the gamma parameters. For this reason, we implement the 
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specifications of model type IIb with the 1γ  value of IIa and LIM IIIb with the values for 0γ  
and 1γ  from LIM IIIa. 
23
  Corrections are made when dividend payments occur within the six months after fiscal 
year end. When the fiscal year ends at 2005-12-31, P is taken from the last trading day of 
June 2006, for example. 
24
  Be aware that stocks with a V/P ratio lower (higher) than one can be in high (low) 
percentile when a model generally yields low (high) intrinsic values in relation to stock 
prices.  
25
  We chose to start with our analysis at the end of June for all companies including 
Infineon, Siemens, and ThyssenKrupp although the end of the fiscal year of the three 
companies is in September. We do this in order to assure that hedge portfolios could be 
generated by an investor. We do not see a problem starting to measure performance nine 
months after the end of the fiscal year since none of the three companies is attributed to 
P1 or P10 by the V/P ratio measured six months after the end of the fiscal year. 
26
  For a discussion of the SR assumptions, see Shukla and Trzcinka (1992), for example. 
We do acknowledge empirical problems related to the SR when fs rr −  is negative. Since 
there are only two negative excess returns in our sample, we do not see a systematic 
problem here. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
FIGURE 1A 
Forecast of Expected Residual Income per Share for Saint Gobain:  
Models I and II with Firm-Specific Discount Rate 
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FIGURE 1B 
Forecast of Expected Residual Income per Share for Saint Gobain:  
Model III with Firm-Specific Discount Rate 
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Notes: 
Evolution of expected RI per share for the company Saint Gobain based on the following 
parameters (in Euro): 41.36bv 2005 = , 95.0RI2005 = , and %68.8r2005 = ; ef is (centred EFI 
ratings multiplied with the value added): ,60.23cg2005 −=  ,55.15hc 2005 =  and 67.64ic 2005 = . 
Since the RI for the year 2005 (valuation date) is known, all models start with the same RI. 
Models II and III generate an equal RI in t = 2 (year 2006), too, since RI is defined as 
tt
a
t bvrff ⋅−=  where tf is the consensus analysts’ forecast of earnings for year t+1. The RI for 
models I and II is mean reverting. This does not hold for model type III. This is due to the term 
t0 bv⋅ω  in the residual income dynamics (9) and the term t0 bv⋅γ  in equation (11). Hence, the 
long run expected RI of Saint Gobain exceeds zero, taking into consideration that accounting is 
conservative. Depending on the respective parameters, the RI in model type III tends to either 
increase or decrease over time. When implemented with constant discount rates, we observe 
similar patterns of residual income evolution. Abbreviations for the different models are explained 
in the notes to table 3. 
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FIGURE 2 
Histograms for Extra-Financial Ratings of the Year 2005 
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Notes:  
Histograms show the frequency of rating values (not centred) for the year 2005. The theoretical 
range for rating values is from 0 to 10 with 10 as best rating score.   
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
 Pearson Correlations for Extra-Financial Ratings 
 
 
CG 2004 CG  2005 HC 2004 HC 2005 IC    2004 
CG 2005 0.776     
 (0.000)***     
HC 2004 -0.111 -0.117    
 (0.401) (0.377)    
HC 2005 -0.123 -0.143 0.188   
 (0.352) (0.280) (0.154)   
IC 2004 0.132 0.178 0.129 0.015  
 (0.318) (0.176) (0.328) (0.913)  
IC 2005 0.151 0.243 0.036 -0.024 0.769 
 (0.253) (0.063)* (0.786) (0.855) (0.000)*** 
Notes: 
The p-values for testing the statistical significance of the correlations are in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 2 
 Financial Data 
 
  
  Percentile 
 
year 20th 40th 50th 60th 80th 
2004 0.321 0.424 0.514 0.61 0.763 
Book-to-
price ratio 
2005 0.313 0.424 0.486 0.513 0.751 
2004 0.045 0.058 0.065 0.074 0.105 Earnings-
to-price 
ratio 2005 0.044 0.064 0.066 0.072 0.091 
2004 0.099 0.138 0.144 0.165 0.232 
Return-on-
equity 
2005 0.106 0.146 0.172 0.201 0.274 
2004 0.007 0.027 0.033 0.039 0.073 
Residual 
income 
2005 0.017 0.031 0.037 0.046 0.071 
Notes: 
Table 2 shows percentiles for key financial variables for the years 2004 and 2005. Book-to-price 
ratio is defined as book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the last trading 
day of the fiscal year. Book value is book value of common shareholders’ equity at the end of the 
fiscal year. Earnings-to-price ratio is the net income available to common divided by the market 
value of equity at the last trading day of the fiscal year. Return-on-equity is defined as net income 
divided by last fiscal year’s book value. RI is net income minus the discount rate times the book 
value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. It is deflated by the market value at the end 
of the previous fiscal year. The book value in 2003 and all accounting variables for the year 2004 
are restated for every firm switching to IFRS. 
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TABLE 3 
Estimation Results of the Model Parameters 
 
Panel A: Residual Income Regressions with Constant Discount Rate 
 Regressions used for models 
Variable 
Exp.  
Sign 
Ia-O 
IIa-OA 
IIIa-COP 
Ib-OCG 
IIb-OACG 
IIIb-COPCG 
Ib-OHC 
IIb-OAHC 
IIIb-COPHC 
Ib-OIC 
IIb-OAIC 
IIIb-COPIC 
 
 
    
Intercept )( 0ω  +/- 0.0172 
(0.009)*** 
0.0184 
(0.013)** 
0.0177 
(0.006)*** 
0.0171 
(0.014)** 
tRI  )( 1ω  + 0.7015 
(0.000)*** 
0.6999 
(0.000)*** 
0.7471 
(0.000)*** 
0.7076 
(0.000)*** 
tcg  )( 2ω  +  -0.0087 
(0.360) 
  
thc  )( 2ω  +   0.0437 
(0.035)** 
 
tic  )( 2ω  +    -0.0019 
(0.832) 
Adjusted R²  30.86% 22.50% 35.45% 29.51% 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Estimation Results of the Model Parameters 
 
Panel B: Residual Income Regressions with Firm-Specific Discount Rate 
 Regressions used for models 
Variable 
Exp.  
Sign 
Ia-O 
IIa-OA 
IIIa-COP 
Ib-OCG 
IIb-OACG 
IIIb-COPCG 
Ib-OHC 
IIb-OAHC 
IIIb-COPHC 
Ib-OIC 
IIb-OAIC 
IIIb-COPIC 
 
 
    
Intercept )( 0ω  +/- 0.0162 
(0.011)** 
0.0169 
(0.018)** 
0.0169 
(0.007)*** 
0.0161 
(0.016)** 
tRI  )( 1ω  + 0.7357 
(0.000)*** 
0.7475 
(0.000)*** 
0.7752 
(0.000)*** 
0.7425 
(0.000)*** 
tcg  )( 2ω  +  -0.0090 
(0.342) 
  
thc  )( 2ω  +   0.0432 
(0.037)** 
 
tic  )( 2ω  +    -0.0039 
(0.654) 
Adjusted R²  35.87% 28.56% 39.94% 34.78% 
 
 
 
Panel C: Extra-Financial Autoregressions 
1tt101t cgcg ++ ε+⋅β+β=    (Ib-OCG, IIb-OACG, IIIb-COPCG) 
0β : -0.0552 
(0.207) 
1β : 0.6182 
(0.000)*** 
 Adj. R² 
52.94% 
1tt101t hchc ++ ε+⋅β+β=    (Ib-OHC, IIb-OAHC, IIIb-COPHC) 
0β : 0.0196 
(0.504) 
1β : 0.2031 
(0.121) 
 Adj. R² 
2.68% 
1tt101t icic ++ ε+⋅β+β=    (Ib-OIC, IIb-OAIC, IIIb-COPIC) 
0β : 0.0228 
(0.660) 
1β : 0.8661 
(0.000)*** 
 Adj. R² 
62.94% 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Estimation Results of the Model Parameters 
 
Panel D: “Other Information” Autoregressions 
For constant discount rates: 
1tt101t ++ ε+ν⋅γ+γ=ν   (IIa-OA, IIb-OACG, -OAHC, -OAIC) 
0γ : 0.0184 
(0.000)*** 
1γ : 0.1039 
(0.414) 
 Adj. R² 
0.00% 
1tt101t ++ ε+ν⋅γ+γ=ν         (IIIa-COP, IIIb-COPCG, -COPHC, -COPIC) 
0γ : 0.0096 
(0.007)*** 
1γ : 0.1292 
(0.253) 
 Adj. R² 
0.61% 
 
For firm-specific discount rates: 
1tt101t ++ ε+ν⋅γ+γ=ν    (IIa-OA, IIb-OACG, -OAHC, -OAIC) 
0γ : 0.0183 
(0.000)*** 
1γ : 0.1021 
(0.430) 
 Adj. R² 
0.00% 
1tt101t ++ ε+ν⋅γ+γ=ν    (IIIa-COP, IIb-COPCG, -COPHC, -COPIC) 
0γ : 0.0099 
(0.007)*** 
1γ : 0.1169 
(0.287) 
 Adj. R² 
0.29% 
Notes:  
The equations are estimated using cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions for the data 
in the period 2004 and 2005. To reduce the influence of scale effects, all variables are deflated by 
the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year t. To reduce the effect of outliers, the 
largest and smallest observation of each variable were omitted. Figures in parentheses are p-
values based on t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Model type I is based on Ohlson (1995) but does not consider analysts’ earnings 
forecasts: Ia-O is the model without EFI. Ib-OCG, Ib-OHC, and Ib-OIC are similar to Ia-O, 
however, they additionally include CG, HC, and IC information, respectively. Model type II is also 
based on Ohlson (1995) but includes “other information” tν : IIa-OA is without EFI and IIb-OACG, 
IIb-OAHC, and IIb-OAIC are similar to IIa-OA but additionally include CG, HC, and IC information, 
respectively. Model type III based on COP (2006) includes analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
considers conservative accounting: IIIa-COP is the basic model whereas IIIb-COPCG, IIIb-
COPHC, and IIIb-COPIC in addition include CG, HC, and IC information, respectively. 
Panel A and B: The dependent variable is 1tRI +  in all regressions. RI for year t is defined as 
1ttt bvrxRI −⋅−=  where tx  denotes net income available to common for year t, r is the discount 
rate, and 1tbv −  is the book value of shareholders’ equity at time t-1.  
Panel A, B and C: In order to transform the extra-financial ratings in monetary variables, we 
multiply the ratings with the value added of year t. Thus tcg , for example, is the centred 
corporate governance rating score of year t multiplied with the value added of year t.  
Panel D: The “other information” variable tν  is computed as [ ] t11ttt RIRIE ⋅ω−=ν +  for model 
type II and as [ ] ( )t1t01ttt RIbvRIE ⋅ω+⋅ω−=ν +  for model type III where 
[ ] ttat1tt bvrffRIE ⋅−==+ . tf is the consensus analysts’ forecast of earnings for year t+1 and is 
equal to the I/B/E/S median forecast of earnings for year t+1 measured in June of year t+1. 
Parameters necessary for calculating tν  are obtained from panel A and B (values are taken from 
IIa-OA and IIIa-COP).  
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TABLE 4 
Valuation Errors 
 
Constant Discount Rate Firm-Specific Discount Rate 
LIM 
VE AVE SQVE VE AVE SQVE 
Ia-O 0.459 0.467 0.260 0.452 0.460 0.253 
Ib-OCG 0.460 0.465 0.261 0.450 0.455 0.251 
Ib-OHC 0.441 0.459 0.251 0.434 0.455 0.245 
Ib-OIC 0.458 0.467 0.259 0.451 0.461 0.253 
IIa-OA 0.414 0.425 0.216 0.404 0.416 0.209 
IIb-OACG 0.415 0.425 0.217 0.401 0.411 0.206 
IIb-OAHC 0.400 0.412 0.204 0.389 0.402 0.197 
IIb-OAIC 0.413 0.425 0.215 0.402 0.416 0.208 
IIIa-COP -0.506 0.617 0.685 -0.826 0.941 1.618 
IIIb-COPCG -0.542 0.647 0.747 -0.908 1.014 1.867 
IIIb-COPHC -0.668 0.746 0.970 -1.045 1.135 2.329 
IIIb-COPIC -0.520 0.627 0.708 -0.849 0.962 1.694 
Notes: 
The table presents mean valuation errors. Where 
P
VPVE −= , VEAVE = , and ( )²VESQVE = . 
The intrinsic value (V) at the end of the fiscal year 2005 is compared to the stock price (P) at the 
end of the month ending six months after the end of the fiscal year. Abbreviations for the different 
models are explained in the notes to table 3. 
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TABLE 5 
Correlation between Stock Price and Fundamental Value 
 
Constant Discount Rate Firm-Specific Discount Rate 
LIM 
Pearson Spearman Pearson Spearman 
Ia-O 0.725 0.866 0.736 0.874 
Ib-OCG 0.721 0.858 0.735 0.867 
Ib-OHC 0.714 0.873 0.722 0.885 
Ib-OIC 0.725 0.867 0.732 0.877 
IIa-OA 0.824 0.881 0.833 0.891 
IIb-OACG 0.822 0.875 0.835 0.882 
IIb-OAHC 0.837 0.888 0.845 0.893 
IIb-OAIC 0.825 0.883 0.832 0.886 
IIIa-COP 0.726 0.855 0.676 0.804 
IIIb-COPCG 0.723 0.851 0.673 0.804 
IIIb-COPHC 0.727 0.856 0.670 0.799 
IIIb-COPIC 0.726 0.856 0.674 0.807 
Notes: 
The table presents the correlation coefficients between the intrinsic value V at the end of the 
fiscal year 2005 as calculated by the different models and the stock price at the end of the month 
ending six months after the end of the fiscal year. Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
are significantly different from zero on a 1% level for constant and firm-specific discount rates. 
Abbreviations for the different models are explained in the notes to table 3. 
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TABLE 6 
 Predictive Ability of V/P Decile Portfolios with Respect to Stock Returns over the Following Year 
 
Panel A: Constant Discount Rate 
 LIM Ia- Ib- Ib- Ib- IIa- IIb- IIb- IIb- IIIa- IIIb- IIIb- IIIb- 
Portfolio  O OCG OHC OIC OA OACG OAHC OAIC COP COPCG COPHC COPIC 
P1 (low V/P)  0.257 0.257 0.237 0.237 0.247 0.247 0.212 0.247 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.214 
P2  0.297 0.297 0.318 0.274 0.255 0.295 0.291 0.255 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.371 
P3  0.336 0.336 0.269 0.382 0.356 0.386 0.356 0.356 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 
P4  0.416 0.416 0.494 0.413 0.310 0.234 0.310 0.304 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 
P5  0.381 0.381 0.387 0.343 0.506 0.548 0.543 0.548 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.470 
P6  0.264 0.264 0.308 0.309 0.384 0.272 0.357 0.341 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.303 
P7  0.377 0.361 0.378 0.377 0.239 0.471 0.401 0.263 0.352 0.340 0.340 0.352 
P8  0.387 0.403 0.265 0.379 0.483 0.308 0.308 0.460 0.616 0.628 0.628 0.616 
P9  0.549 0.549 0.433 0.556 0.514 0.514 0.514 0.514 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.367 
P10 (high V/P) 0.504 0.504 0.685 0.504 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.481 
Hedge 
(P10 - P1) 0.247 0.247 0.448 0.267 0.245 0.245 0.281 0.245 0.319 0.319 0.319 0.267 
p-values  (0.242) (0.242) (0.066) (0.197) (0.242) (0.242) (0.155) (0.242) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.242) 
Notes:  
Table values present equally weighted one year buy-and-hold stock returns for the decile portfolios based on the V/P ratios of the last trading day of June 
2006. The hedge portfolio return is defined as the difference in the average return between portfolio P10 and P1. p-values are based on a one-tailed 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians. It is based on the respective returns of shares in P1 and P10. Abbreviations for the different models 
are explained in the notes to table 3. 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 Predictive Ability of V/P Decile Portfolios with Respect to Stock Returns over the Following Year 
 
Panel B: Firm-Specific Discount Rate 
 LIM Ia- Ib- Ib- Ib- IIa- IIb- IIb- IIb- IIIa- IIIb- IIIb- IIIb- 
Portfolio  O OCG OHC OIC OA OACG OAHC OAIC COP COPCG COPHC COPIC 
P1 (low V/P)  0.226 0.225 0.226 0.225 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.236 0.240 0.207 0.240 0.207 
P2  0.303 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.228 0.231 0.231 0.279 0.375 0.408 0.375 0.376 
P3  0.369 0.444 0.506 0.455 0.370 0.367 0.367 0.374 0.424 0.424 0.440 0.456 
P4  0.469 0.394 0.284 0.353 0.504 0.499 0.512 0.360 0.411 0.411 0.391 0.411 
P5  0.298 0.298 0.323 0.317 0.359 0.365 0.351 0.449 0.350 0.350 0.355 0.350 
P6  0.327 0.308 0.341 0.391 0.396 0.337 0.396 0.396 0.319 0.356 0.356 0.319 
P7  0.346 0.265 0.414 0.392 0.374 0.430 0.374 0.272 0.585 0.554 0.572 0.585 
P8  0.393 0.464 0.311 0.305 0.315 0.308 0.315 0.417 0.323 0.323 0.305 0.323 
P9  0.543 0.498 0.387 0.490 0.473 0.596 0.514 0.503 0.511 0.511 0.511 0.511 
P10 (high V/P) 0.504 0.575 0.685 0.557 0.533 0.410 0.492 0.504 0.237 0.237 0.237 0.237 
Hedge 
(P10 - P1) 0.278 0.349 0.459 0.331 0.298 0.174 0.256 0.268 -0.003 0.030 -0.003 0.030 
p-values  (0.197) (0.197) (0.066) (0.197) (0.120) (0.350) (0.242) (0.197) (0.650) (0.591) (0.650) (0.591) 
Notes:  
Table values present equally weighted one year buy-and-hold stock returns for the decile portfolios based on the V/P ratios of the last trading day of June 
2006. The hedge portfolio return is defined as the difference in the average return between portfolio P10 and P1. p-values are based on a one-tailed 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians. It is based on the respective returns of shares in P1 and P10. Abbreviations for the different models 
are explained in the notes to table 3. 
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TABLE 7 
V/P Decile Portfolios and Median Sharpe Ratio 
 
Panel A: Constant Discount Rate 
 LIM Ia- Ib- Ib- Ib- IIa- IIb- IIb- IIb- IIIa- IIIb- IIIb- IIIb- 
Portfolio  O OCG OHC OIC OA OACG OAHC OAIC COP COPCG COPHC COPIC 
P1 (low V/P)  2.780 2.780 2.780 2.780 3.634 3.634 3.309 3.634 2.780 2.780 2.780 2.780 
P2  4.245 4.245 4.301 3.668 2.814 2.814 3.082 2.814 4.773 4.773 4.773 4.773 
P3  4.528 4.528 3.116 5.872 4.460 5.872 4.460 4.460 3.633 3.633 3.633 3.633 
P4  4.346 4.346 5.332 4.346 4.004 3.451 4.004 3.944 3.744 3.744 3.744 3.744 
P5  5.145 5.145 5.403 5.145 5.332 6.308 6.308 6.308 5.332 5.332 5.332 5.332 
P6  4.379 4.379 4.379 4.379 3.752 3.752 3.752 3.752 5.034 5.034 5.034 5.034 
P7  4.411 4.411 3.758 4.411 2.232 4.411 4.411 3.400 4.165 4.165 4.165 4.165 
P8  3.547 3.547 2.555 3.103 4.784 2.943 2.943 3.347 4.374 4.374 4.374 4.374 
P9  4.148 4.148 3.586 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 1.907 1.907 1.907 3.836 
P10 (high V/P) 4.155 4.155 7.305 4.155 4.155 4.155 4.155 4.155 4.603 4.603 4.603 3.508 
p-values  (0.242) (0.242) (0.066) (0.242) (0.294) (0.294) (0.242) (0.294) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.294) 
Notes:  
Table presents median Sharpe Ratios for shares in decile portfolios based on the V/P ratios of the last trading day of June 2006. p-values are based on a 
one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians. It is for the respective Sharpe Ratios of shares in P10 and P1. Abbreviations for the 
different models are explained in the notes to table 3. 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
V/P Decile Portfolios and Median Sharpe Ratio 
 
Panel B: Firm-Specific Discount Rate 
 LIM Ia- Ib- Ib- Ib- IIa- IIb- IIb- IIb- IIIa- IIIb- IIIb- IIIb- 
Portfolio  O OCG OHC OIC OA OACG OAHC OAIC COP COPCG COPHC COPIC 
P1 (low V/P)  2.455 2.455 2.455 2.455 2.723 2.723 2.723 2.723 2.402 2.134 2.402 2.134 
P2  4.773 4.327 4.773 4.327 2.814 3.749 3.749 4.459 3.774 4.773 3.774 4.773 
P3  4.460 6.176 6.803 6.176 3.774 3.141 3.141 3.774 3.633 3.633 3.633 3.658 
P4  4.899 4.346 4.346 2.181 6.530 6.530 6.530 3.633 5.403 5.403 3.890 5.403 
P5  4.385 4.385 3.451 4.140 3.944 4.004 4.210 4.407 3.915 3.915 4.729 3.915 
P6  3.752 3.752 5.034 5.407 5.407 5.034 5.407 5.407 5.263 5.263 5.263 5.263 
P7  4.821 3.314 5.553 5.225 2.897 5.517 2.897 2.897 5.495 5.239 5.239 5.495 
P8  3.511 5.957 2.555 2.999 4.784 2.943 4.784 5.076 3.840 3.840 3.470 3.840 
P9  4.964 4.964 2.561 4.964 4.964 7.014 5.373 5.373 5.511 5.511 5.511 5.511 
P10 (high V/P) 4.155 4.155 7.305 4.155 4.603 3.508 4.155 4.155 3.398 3.398 3.398 3.398 
p-values  (0.120) (0.120) (0.032) (0.120) (0.066) (0.242) (0.155) (0.155) (0.197) (0.120) (0.197) (0.120) 
Notes:  
Table presents median Sharpe Ratios for shares in decile portfolios based on the V/P ratios of the last trading day of June 2006. p-values are based on a 
one-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum test for differences in medians. It is for the respective Sharpe Ratios of shares in P10 and P1. Abbreviations for the 
different models are explained in the notes to table 3. 
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TABLE 8 
Estimation Results for Probit Regression 
 
j3j2j10j GAAP_localGAAP_US)mvfflog(ins ⋅δ+⋅δ+⋅δ+δ=  
0δ : -0.7802 
(0.055)* 
1δ : 0.5585 
(0.001)*** 
2δ : 1.1191 
(0.062)* 
3δ : -0.3240 
(0.320) 
McFadden  R² 
15.48% 
Notes:  
The equation is estimated using a cross-sectional probit regression for data of the year 2004. 
Figures in parentheses are p-values based on z-statistics. The variable jins  is coded 1, if a firm j 
is in the sample and zero otherwise. )mvfflog( j  is the natural logarithm of the free float market 
value (divided by 1.000.000) at the end of the year 2004. The variables jGAAP_US  and 
jGAAP_local  denote the applied accounting standard in the year 2004. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
